Abstract
Do states change when they acquire nuclear weapons? This article looks at the consequences of nuclear acquisition on democratic states. It argues that nuclear acquisition is best understood as a process of political change through which state actors adapt existing institutions to the new, and unprecedented, challenges created by nuclear weapons. One form of this process of “nuclearization” is the development of nuclear secrecy regimes, which results from actors’ desire to maintain control over information they perceive as potentially having major security implications. Actors may not know what, exactly, must be concealed. The ultimate stakes of nuclear policy, however, are so high that they have incentives not to take their chances. Secrecy has implications for democratic governance: it can exclude actors from decision-making, distort information made available to the public, and be abused by actors in search of autonomy from democratic control. As a result, nuclear secrecy affects the overall level of public consultation inside a state, causing a democratic recoil. To borrow Charles Tilly’s concept, during this process of nuclearization, states also de-democratize. To make this case, the article examines the French nuclear secrecy regime from 1945 to 1974. Drawing on primary sources, it traces the origins of nuclear secrecy in France back to security concerns and shows how this development ultimately reduced the level of public consultation in France and caused a form of de-democratization.